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he ﬁnancial crisis and the recession of 2007–2009 have shown the
importance of government regulation and intervention in the ﬁnancial
services sector. During the crisis, governments in Europe and North
America, among others, implemented a large variety of actions intended to
mitigate the adverse impact of the ﬁnancial sector disruptions on the macro-
economy as a whole. Soon after, broad-ranging reforms of the government
oversight and regulation policies of the ﬁnancial sector were introduced. One
of the central objectives of these reforms is to improve government policy
toward large ﬁnancial institutions that face, or are in, the state of insolvency.
The problem of optimal design of government policy toward ﬁnancial
institutions in distress is very complex. This article is devoted to discussing
one important aspect of this problem: the issue of time consistency. Our main
objectiveinthisarticleistoprovideanelementaryexpositionofafundamental
economic insight of Kydland and Prescott (1977), which is that an ex ante
optimal policy may require the government to tolerate inefﬁcient outcomes
ex post. In the context of policy toward insolvent institutions, this means that
optimal policy may require the government to refrain from bailing out a ﬁrm
despite the large adverse consequences that the ﬁrm’s failure may have for the
macroeconomy as a whole. To make this point, in the ﬁrst part of this article,
we build a simple model with a time-consistency problem associated with
the government bailout policy toward large (systemically important) ﬁnancial
institutions.
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Asamatterofpractice, perhapsbecauseofpolitical-economyconstraints,
it may be impossible for a future, benevolent government to tolerate large
adverseconsequencesofitsinactioninastateofeconomiccrisis, evenifthere
are good reasons ex ante (prior to a possible crisis) to promise to not act ex
post. As private-market participants are aware of this intolerance, the govern-
ment will be expected to bail out large insolvent ﬁrms in order to protect the
macroeconomy in crisis. This expectation may give private-sector investors
an incentive to take on excessive risks, because large losses that excessive
risk-taking can generate may be socialized, i.e., borne in part by the taxpayer,
while large gains that can be realized will generally be retained by the in-
vestors. Recognizing this incentive, the government should take action ex
ante to eliminate excessive risk-taking before the crisis state is induced.
In the second part of this article, we use the simple framework of our
model to discuss some policies that have, in various formats, been proposed
as means for either diminishing the probability of the next crisis or decreasing
the severity of it. In particular, we discuss the following ﬁve types of miti-
gating measures: changes to the ﬁnancial sector infrastructure that diminish
the size of the spillover effects; direct government monitoring of risk-taking
in the ﬁnancial sector; regulations banning management and employee com-
pensation practices consistent with ﬁrms’ seeking excessive risks; levying a
tax on extraordinary proﬁts that may be attained in the ﬁnancial sector under
excessive risk-taking; and, ﬁnally, imposing binding capital requirements on
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Given the simple structure of our model, we can discuss these
measures only at a general, abstract level. Such a discussion, however, can
be useful in organizing thoughts relevant to answering the concrete questions
that policymaking and rule-writing authorities must confront in the face of the
time-consistency problem of optimal government regulation of the ﬁnancial
sector.
Our analysis shows that government resolution policy toward large ﬁnan-
cialﬁrmscanbehelpfulineliminatingexcessiverisk-takingonlytotheextent
that it decreases the negative spillover effect caused by failure of a large ﬁ-
nancial ﬁrm. Moreover, in order to have any effect, plans for ex post actions,
like the resolution regime, must reduce the spillover effect to a level tolerable
by a future government facing a state of crisis. Changes in policy that only
marginallydecreasethespillovereffectdonothaveanyimpactontheequilib-
rium outcome. It is also clear in our model that the resolution regime should
not be viewed as a commitment device for the government. Although insti-
tutional structure can have an effect on ﬁnal outcomes, if future governments
lack commitment, it will be impossible to achieve the commitment outcome
by having the current government legislate that no bailouts are to be had in the
future. Thus, the only way to eliminate inefﬁcient bailouts is to remove the
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losses. An efﬁcient resolution mechanism can do it only if it can eliminate the
negative spillover.
Assuming that spillover effects cannot be completely eliminated, a com-
bination of binding capital requirements and monitoring of risk-taking and
managerialincentivesseemnecessarytoeliminatetheinefﬁcientbailoutequi-
librium. These policies can achieve the efﬁcient outcome not by giving the
government the power to commit, but rather by preventing the private sector
from taking advantage of the government’s lack of that power. In this way,
current restrictions on the private sector’s actions prevent damaging spillovers
and, hence, remove future governments’ temptation to use public funds to
cover private losses. To be sure, capital requirements and monitoring of risk-
taking are costly. Yet, these costs should be weighed against the cost of
allowing the private sector to take on risks large enough to induce the next
ﬁnancial crisis.
TheresultsofKydlandandPrescott(1977)spurredalargeliteratureonthe
economics of optimal government policy with time-consistency constraints.
This literature primarily focuses on ﬁscal and monetary policy of the govern-
ment. Important contributions to the analysis of these problems include Barro
andGordon(1983); LucasandStokey(1983); ChariandKehoe(1990); Chari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998); and King and Wolman (2004). Beyond
the applications to ﬁscal and monetary policy, Cochrane (1995) studies the
provision of long-term health insurance and King (2006) discusses the time-
consistency problem in the context of government policy toward ﬂoodplain
development and the provision of insurance against catastrophic events.
An article most directly related to the topic of the present article is Chari
andKehoe(2009). Likewedohere,theystudytheproblemoftimeconsistency
ofgovernmentbailoutpolicywhenbankruptcyiscostlyexpost. Inadditionto
this problem, Chari and Kehoe (2009) simultaneously address the question of
why optimal contracts within the ﬁrm lead to costly bankruptcies. Our model
provides an exposition of the time-consistency issue at a more elementary
level. In particular, we make strong assumptions on investors’ preferences




2 studies equilibrium with government policy choices restricted to the singe
option: bailout or ﬁrm failure. The time inconsistency of optimal policy is
presentedthere. Section3considersadditionalpolicytoolsandtheirpotential
for eliminating time inconsistency. Section 4 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
Consider a ﬁnancial institution (ﬁrm) with total liabilities normalized to one.
The ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure will be modelled as consisting of debt with face136 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
value 1 − k and equity in the amount k<1. (To keep a concrete number in
mind, we can think of k as being equal to 0.05.)
There are three homogenous classes of agents in the model: ﬁnancial in-
stitutionequityholders,ﬁnancialinstitutionsdebtholders,andthegovernment.
Uncertainty is represented in the model simply by two equally likely states of
nature: a good state g, and a bad state b.
Therearetwopossibleprojectsthattheinstitutioncaninvestin: aprudent
project P and a risky project R. Each project takes an up-front investment
of size normalized to one. Given the funds available to the ﬁrm, only one
project can be funded. The funded project represents the asset side of the
ﬁrm’s balance sheet.
The payoff structure of the projects is as follows. The prudent project P
pays1+k instateg, and1−k instateb. NotethattheexpectedreturnonP is
E[P] = 1+k
2 + 1−k
2 = 1. Thus, discounting with zero net interest rate, the net
present value (NPV) of P is zero. Also note that the return on P is sufﬁcient
to cover the ﬁrm’s debt face value in every state of nature. The risky project
R pays 2−δ in state g, and 0 in state b, where δ>0. The expected return on
R is E[R] = 0
2 + 2−δ
2 = 1 − δ
2 < 1, i.e., the NPV of R is negative. We will
assume 2 − δ>1 + k, i.e.,
1 − δ>k , (1)
which means that R has a higher best-case-scenario payoff than P.( F o r
example,wecouldthinkofδ asbeingequalto0.8.) Becausebothprojectspay
more in state g then they do in state b, we will call states g and b, respectively,
good and bad.
We will assume that bond investors are risk-averse with preferences given
by −I +min{Db,D g}, where I is the amount invested and Db and Dg are the
returnsontheinvestmentI instateb andg, respectively. Thus, bondinvestors
value only the riskless part of the state-contingent return vector (Dg,D b).
Given these preferences, the ﬁrm must provide a riskless gross return equal
to one in order to ﬂoat debt. Under the prudent project P, the ﬁrm’s assets
are worth at least 1 − k in every state of nature, but in state b they are not
worth more than that. Thus, 1 − k is the largest face value of riskless debt
that the ﬁrm should be able to ﬂoat under project P without any anticipation
of government bailout.
Equity investors are risk-neutral, discount at the same net interest rate of
zero, and seek to maximize the return on equity.
Thegovernmenthasalossfunctionwithpenaltyproportionaltothelosses
suffered by debt investors, in case they suffer any. This loss function captures
the adverse effects that an event of default of the ﬁnancial institution would
have on the broader economy. For every dollar lost by the bond investors, the
adverse effect on the broader economy is M dollars. Thus, given that the loss
sustained by debt is max{I − D,0}, the loss function of the government isB. Grochulski: Time-Consistency and Resolution Policy 137
given by M max{I − D,0}. This loss function is motivated by the fact that
debt investments may be leveraged and, thus, the ﬁrm’s default may trigger
deleveraging and a cycle of additional defaults in the economy. Also, debt
defaults may cause disruptions in the secondary wholesale funding market,
where ﬁxed income instruments are used as collateral. We do not assume here
that losses in equity value lead to such disruptions. Particularly interesting
will be the case of M>1. In this case, the loss to the larger economy exceeds
the private loss debtholders sustain in case of ﬁrm default.
In the baseline model, agents take actions sequentially in three rounds.
These rounds of moves describe the strategic interaction that takes place be-
tween debt investors, equity investors, and the government. First, the govern-
ment announces its policy. Second, investors invest funds and select which
project the ﬁrm will take on: P or R. Then, nature chooses the state of the
world: g or b. Third, the government can take action. In the baseline case,
we concentrate on the government policy choice consisting of bailing the
debtholders out or not bailing them out in the event of ﬁrm default. Later on,
we will extend this framework to consider other actions that the government
could take, like making additional transfers, levying taxes, imposing capital
requirements, applying a resolution policy toward the ﬁrm (if needed), etc.
We will consider several speciﬁcations.
DenotingbyD,E,andGthepayoffsto,respectively,debt,equity,andthe
government, Figure 1 summarizes the three stages of interaction between the
agentsandpresentsterminalpayoffsabsentanygovernmentaction. Thereare
four terminal nodes in the game tree depicted in Figure 1: two representing
payoffs under project P and two representing payoffs under project R. The
ﬁrm is insolvent only if it selects the risky project R and the state of nature
is bad. The payoffs in that case are given in the bottom node of the game
tree. Since the ﬁrm’s assets are worth zero in this state, so are its liabilities.
Throughchannelsthatarenotmodelledhere, bonddefaultcausesadisruption
to the larger economy, which in turn gives the government a negative payoff
of −(1−k)M. To emphasize, Figure 1 shows payoffs that are realized in the
absence of any government transfers or other actions.
We want to analyze the effect of government policy on the ﬁnal outcome
of the game. This outcome will be determined by the actions that debt and
equity investors choose under a given speciﬁcation of government policy. An
outcome in which the investors’ actions maximize their proﬁt will be called
an equilibrium.
2. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENTACTION WITH POLICY
OPTIONS RESTRICTED TO BAILOUT OR NO BAILOUT
In this section, we consider the outcomes that strategic interaction given in
the game form speciﬁed above will lead to under two possible government138 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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actions in the crisis/insolvency node of the event tree. Action one is to bail out
the debtholders and avoid the disruption to the larger economy. Action two
is the opposite: no bailout. This set of actions available to the government is
very restrictive, and we relax it in the next section. In this section, we analyze
this case to highlight the problem of time consistency.
We proceed by asking which action the government would prefer at the
ex post stage if the ﬁrm is insolvent. If the disruption that the ﬁrm’s default
causes is large, bailing the ﬁrm out is optimal ex post. We then study the
optimal policy from the ex ante perspective. We show that not bailing out is
optimal ex ante.
Optimal Ex Post Bailout Policy
Given the payoff structure of Figure 1, let us consider the question of optimal
government action in the “crisis” node in which the ﬁrm is insolvent. If the
bottom payoff node of the game tree in Figure 1 is reached, the ﬁrm defaults,
debtholderssufferaloss1−k,andthegovernmentsuffersaloss(1−k)M. One
action that the government can take in the crisis node is to bail the debtholders
out, i.e., make them whole by, for example, buying the ﬁrm’s debt at faceB. Grochulski: Time-Consistency and Resolution Policy 139
value. Because the assets backing up these claims are worthless in this node,
thecosttobaildebtholdersoutis1−k. Butbailingdebtholdersouteliminates
any disruption to the larger economy, the cost of which would be (1 − k)M.
Clearly, the optimal government bailout decision in the crisis state depends
on the value of the larger economy disruption parameter M.I f M ≤ 1, the
government’s loss is smaller when the ﬁrm is allowed to fail, i.e., there is
no incentive for the government to bail debtholders out in the crisis node. If
M>1, the best policy for the government in this node is to provide a full
bailout to the debtholders.
Suppose that M>1, which means the best action for the government ex
post is to make debtholders whole if the ﬁrm is insolvent. Given this policy,
whatarethebestinvestmentdecisionsfortheprivate-sectorplayers? Because
debtholders are fully repaid in every terminal node (either by the ﬁrm or by
the government), debt investors provide funds I = 1−k and collect the same
payoff D = 1 − k in every state of nature, independent of which investment
project is implemented. Under this payoff structure, therefore, debtholders
have no incentive to inﬂuence the choice of the investment project, so the ﬁrm
will choose the project that maximizes equityholders’value (i.e., debtholders
do not monitor/discipline equityholders at all).
Which project will then the equityholders choose for the ﬁrm? Despite
the fact that no bailout money is ever given to the equityholders, and despite
the fact that the NPV of P exceeds the NPV of R, the equityholders prefer
project R over project P. Indeed, if P is selected, the expected terminal value
of equity is 0
2 + 2k
2 = k.I fR is selected, the expected terminal value of equity
is 0
2 + 1−δ+k
2 , which is strictly larger than k due to (1). Thus, equity investors
will select R.1
If M>1 and the government uses its best ex post policy, the ﬁrm will
be able to raise the required amount of debt and run the inefﬁcient project R.
This way, the expected value of the equity stake in the ﬁrm is maximized, and
the expected loss to the government is 0
2 + 1−k
2 , which is strictly greater than
zero.
Optimal ExAnte Bailout Policy
Suppose now that the government can choose the action it will take ex post
(i.e.,aftertheprojectpayoffisrealized)alreadyattheexantestage(i.e.,before
private-sector investors act). In particular, the government can announce ex
ante whether or not it will make debt whole ex post in case the crisis node of
the event tree is reached. We assume here that this announcement is credible,
i.e., the announced policy will be adhered to with no reconsideration. What
1 This is a version of the classic risk-shifting problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976). How-
ever, in our model, government plays an important role.140 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
policy would the government choose to commit to? A bailout or letting the
ﬁrm fail?
The answer depends on what the private-sector investors choose ex ante
knowing what the government will do ex post. Consider ﬁrst the policy in
which the government announces it will bail the creditors out if the ﬁrm is
insolvent. As we saw before, under this policy debtholders agree to provide
funds and are indifferent in regard to which project is selected, as they receive
thereservationreturnontheirinvestmentinanystateofnature. Equityholders
prefertheriskyprojectR,soR willbeimplementedbytheﬁrm. Theexpected
loss to the government is 1−k
2 .
Consider now the optimal actions of the private-sector players when the
government announces ex ante that it will not bail the debtholders out in the
crisis state. What is the response of the private agents to this pre-announced
action? Equityholders still want to select R, as this selection continues to
maximizetheexpectedvalueofequity.2 Debtholders,however,refusetoinvest
in the ﬁrm if R is to be selected, because without a government bailout the
value of their investment turns out to be zero with a 50 percent chance.3 Thus,
ifdebtinvestorsaretobeattractedtotheﬁrmatall,theﬁrmmustconvincedebt




for the larger economy, therefore, never occurs. The loss to the government
is zero.
Which of the two options will the government choose? Its own loss is
minimized, attaining the value of zero, with the pre-announced policy of no
bailout. The social value of the outcome obtained under this policy, as well,
is higher than the value obtained under the bailout policy. To see this, recall
that project R has a negative expected NPV of −δ
2 . If the government bails out
ex post, equity investors’ equilibrium response is to implement R, and bond
investors’ equilibrium response is to not care if R or P is implemented. In
this equilibrium, the expected NPV of debt investment is zero, the expected
NPV of equity investment is
1 − δ + k
2
− k =
1 − δ − k
2
, (2)
2 Note that even with the bailout, the ex post value of equity is zero in the crisis state.
Thus, equity payoff is not decreased if there is no bailout in this state.
3 Because we assumed that bond investors are inﬁnitely risk-averse, a cashﬂow with any
chance of zero payout is worth zero to them, and hence they will not invest in project R, absent
government support. The inﬁnite risk-aversion assumption is not critical here. With no bailout,
project R will not be implemented if the risk premium that bond investors require is sufﬁciently
high (not leaving any residual value to equity investors). High risk compensation will be required
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andtheexpectedNPVofthegovernmentlossis 1−k
2 . Addingthelossgenerated










which equals the value of the government loss resulting from the bailout. It
is important to note that under the bailout policy bailout money is paid to
debtholders and the value of equity is “wiped out” in the crisis state. Yet,
effectively, in addition to covering the expected loss of the wasteful project R
selectedbytheﬁrm, governmentbailoutmoneymakesforanindirecthandout
to equityholders in the form of the high expected return that equity investors
earn in this equilibrium.
The social value obtained in equilibrium under the no-bailout policy, in
turn, isnon-negativebecausetheNPVofprojectP iszero.4 Undernobailout,
the equilibrium expected NPV of debt investment and the government loss
are both zero. The value of equity is equal to the NPV of P, which was
normalized to zero. Thus, the pre-announced no-bailout policy leads to an
efﬁcient equilibrium outcome.
Time Consistency and Commitment
A key insight here, which goes back to Kydland and Prescott (1977), is that
the optimal ex ante policy may be not time consistent. What does it mean? If
M>1, we notice that the optimal ex ante policy calls for a different action
in the insolvency node than what the optimal ex post policy calls for once this
node is reached. Thus, the optimal policy plan is not internally consistent as
we move (in time) from the ex ante stage to the ex post stage.
With M ≤ 1, there is no inconsistency. At the ex ante stage, the govern-
ment can announce no bailout and, if the private sector selects project R and
the state of nature is b, the government’s best option ex post is in fact to not
bail out. With M ≤ 1, therefore, the government could announce nothing ex
ante about what it will do and obtain the efﬁcient outcome. This is because
the private sector would be expecting no bailout knowing that the government
faces no ex post incentive to bail out anybody.
With M>1, the government does have an incentive to bail debtholders
outintheinsolvencystate,andtheprivatesectorknowsit. Canthegovernment
convince the private sector to stay away from the risky, inefﬁcient project R
when this project is exactly what maximizes the value of private claims? In
the previous subsection, we assumed that the government can pre-announce
4 It is straightforward to modify the example we have used here to have a strictly positive
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its policy and that the investors take it as given that the government always
adherestothepre-announcedpolicy. Thisseemslikeaverystrongassumption.
A weaker alternative assumption about the government’s commitment
power is that the threat of no bailouts is not a credible one. If the private
sector does not believe that the government can follow through on a promise
to let the ﬁrm fail, then the investors will select project R despite this threat.
Without commitment, thus, the government’s policy choices are reduced to
those plans that are time consistent. In our model, with M>1, this means
that the government cannot promise to not provide a bailout in the crisis node,
and, in effect, the inefﬁcient project R is implemented in equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out here that the inefﬁcient equilibrium would not
exist if there were no government in our model. Debt investors agree to
invest in the wasteful project R because they know that in the crisis state
the government will bail them out. The government is benevolent, yet its
lack of commitment power combined with the assumed spillover effect make
investment in the inefﬁcient project R a rational choice for private-sector
investors. Because governments fulﬁll useful functions unrelated to bailouts
of the ﬁnancial sector, we take the existence of a benevolent, deep-pocketed
government as given in our model.
In conclusion, the analysis in this section shows that a government whose
policy options for resolution of a large ﬁnancial institution are restricted to
bailing out or allowing for failure is in a very difﬁcult position when M>1,
i.e., when the spillover effects of the ﬁrm’s failure are large. The ex ante opti-
mal policy is not time consistent. Unless the government is committed to not
bailing out failing ﬁrms regardless of the consequences, and the market par-
ticipantsactuallybelievethis, excessiverisksaretakenandinefﬁcientbailouts
happen in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, although debt- not equityholders
receive bailout funds, taxpayers make an indirect handout of value to equi-
tyholders.5 In addition to this transfer, economic value is lost through ﬁrms’
selection of inefﬁcient investment projects whose large upside value makes
the handout to equityholders possible. In the next section, we discuss several
possibilities for how an expanded policy choice set can alleviate the problem
of time inconsistency.
3. ALLEVIATING THE TIME-CONSISTENCY PROBLEM
The direct way of combating the time-inconsistency problem is to build an
infrastructure acting as a so-called commitment device for the policymaker.
A commitment device is something that makes it very costly, or—better yet—
impossible, for the decisionmaker to deviate ex post from the pre-announced
5 Note that even when the government provides a bailout, the equity value is “wiped out”
in the bad state b. Despite this wiping out, equityholders do beneﬁt from the bailout.B. Grochulski: Time-Consistency and Resolution Policy 143
course of action. In simple decisionmaking settings with time-consistency
problems, commitment devices may be available and effective.6 In the case
of the optimal government policy toward a large ﬁnancial institution, because
of political-process constraints, for example, such devices may be difﬁcult or
impossibletoimplement. Inthissection,wewillthereforediscussalternative,
indirect ways in which the time-consistency problem may be alleviated or
altogether avoided in this model.
In particular, we will discuss the following ﬁve possibilities:
1. Decreasing the impact of ﬁrm failure on the larger economy.
2. Direct monitoring of the ﬁrm’s risk-taking by the government.
3. Banning employee compensation practices indicative of excessive
risk-taking.
4. Taxing extraordinary proﬁts.
5. Imposing binding capital requirements on the ﬁrm.
Inallthesecases, ourdiscussionchanges, orgoesbeyond, thebasicstruc-
ture of the model we described in Section 1.
Decreasing M
It is clear from the previous discussion that there is no time-inconsistency
problem when M ≤ 1. Therefore, if there are actions that can be taken in
practice to decrease the negative spillover effect of a single ﬁrm’s default on
the economy as a whole (i.e., decreasing M), these can clearly be useful to
alleviate the time-consistency problem.
Efﬁcient resolution policy under either the bankruptcy code or the
Orderly Liquidation Authority of the Dodd-Frank Act can be consistent with
reducing M. The question of what is the best way to reduce the negative ex
post spillover effect is beyond the scope of this article. However, our analy-
sis of the time-consistency problem provides an important observation. The
inefﬁcient bailout equilibrium can be eliminated not by legislating commit-
ment, but rather by building a legal framework and ﬁnancial infrastructure in
which the government is no longer tempted to bail ﬁrms out as the spillover
effects become relatively small. Therefore, government resolution policy to-
ward large ﬁnancial ﬁrms improves economic efﬁciency to the extent that it
helps decrease spillovers. If the negative spillover effect of a ﬁnancial ﬁrm
6A driver who tends to impulsively speed in certain road conditions may choose to drive
an underpowered car in order to eliminate the possibility of acting on this impulse. In this case,
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default remains large, the government will be tempted to bail the ﬁrm out
in a crisis state regardless of what the pre-announced resolution policy may
say. Therefore, evenifthepre-announcedpolicypromisesnobailouts, private
sector investors may still expect a bailout to occur as long as spillovers are
sufﬁciently large. As we have seen, such an expectation may lead to excessive
risk-taking by the private sector.
Atadeeperlevel, however, onecouldaskwhyM shouldbelarger(greater
than one) in the ﬁrst place. Why is there a spillover effect?
We will not be able to address this question using the simple model at
hand, but it is clear that there are two possibilities here. One is that the nature
of the ﬁnancial intermediation technology is such that having M>1 is more
productive than having M ≤ 1. This may be because of increasing returns
to scale in the provision of ﬁnancial services, beneﬁts of leverage, synergies
from having different ﬁnancial product lines under one corporate structure,
etc. If this is the reason for M>1, then changing resolution policies or
forcing institutions into a shape in which their M is less than one has real
costs. These costs should be weighted against the costs of moral hazard—
excessive risk-taking—that arise in equilibrium with bailouts.
The other possibility is that there are no increasing returns to scale, but
rather institutions become large/leveraged/interconnected precisely because,
with M>1, they receive an implicit and unpriced government guarantee for
their debtholders. If ﬁrms become large (often in this context called “too big
to fail”) not for efﬁcient production reasons but just so they can take on risk
backed up by the unpriced government guarantee, then there is no economic
cost to changing resolution policy or forcing the institutions into a shape in
which their M ≤ 1.
Given the scale of the time-consistency problem discussed here, further
research directed at discerning which of these two possibilities is in fact a
correct representation of reality is needed. This question is very difﬁcult
partly because, going back and gathering data, it is not easy to establish the
exact policy regime that was in effect when the data were generated. Even
more so, it is hard to know what the private sector’s perception of the policy
regime was at the time. As we have discussed, this perception has a strong
impact on behavior and, thus, will have an impact on the data gathered.
Direct Monitoring of Project Choice
Clearly, ifthegovernmentcandirectlymonitortheﬁrmandcontrolthechoice
of the project, then it can ensure that the risky and wasteful project R is not
implemented. This would eliminate the need for bailout because the ﬁrm is
never insolvent if R is never implemented.B. Grochulski: Time-Consistency and Resolution Policy 145
Monitoring and controlling ﬁrms’risk-taking is a traditional role of bank
supervision, which of course is a costly activity. These costs, however, may
be smaller then the expected present value of the ex post bailout costs.
Weshouldnote,however,thatmonitoringtheﬁrmsmaynotbe100percent
effective, in the following sense. As long as risky projects R are out there
and the government cannot commit to no bailouts, equity investors have an
incentivetoescapethecontrolofthegovernmentbyfundingtheprojectoutside
ofthescopeofanycontrolmechanismsthatthegovernmentmayhaveinplace
at a particular point in time. (Recall the pre-crisis “shadow banking system.”)
Thus, in addition to monitoring the existing ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the government
should monitor risk-taking in general to minimize the possibility that project
R is implemented under some other institutional arrangement that could have
similaradverseconsequencesfortheeconomyasawhole. Thisaddsdifﬁculty
to the task of direct government monitoring of risk-taking.
Compensation Restrictions
One way in which the government could prevent the ﬁrm from implementing
project R could be to limit the compensation practices that give the ﬁrm’s em-
ployees incentives to take large risks.7 In our simple model, we think of equi-
tyholdersasthosechoosingtheinvestmentproject,i.e.,theprojectbeingapart
of the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm. In practice, shareholders hire staff/management
to operate the project. For large ﬁrms, in particular, hired managers control




usually are large. If the shareholders desire to structure the ﬁrm in such a way
that it takes on large risks similar to our risky project R, the compensation
package for its manager may be different than that under which the manager
would be implementing a prudent project similar to P.
Executive compensation schemes may be easier to examine than the
whole portfolio of the ﬁrm’s assets. Therefore, one way for the regulators to
limit risk-taking may be to regulate executive compensation schemes at large
ﬁnancial institutions. Because of standard (not related to the possibility
of government bailout) agency problems faced by ﬁnancial ﬁrms, identify-
ing compensation schemes that induce excessive risk-taking (as opposed to
those that merely induce adequate managerial effort) may be very difﬁcult in
7 In the Unites States, as well as in Europe, regulatory agencies are currently working on
rules restricting loan ofﬁcers’ and bank executives’ compensation with that goal in mind. (For
a rule proposal on incentive-based compensation arrangements in the United States see Federal
Register, Vol. 76, No. 72, April 14, 2011. Loan ofﬁcer compensation rules have been amended
in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 185, September 24, 2010.)146 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
practice. Phelan and Clement (2009) and Jarque and Prescott (2010) study
optimalcompensationofbankersusingthetoolsofmechanism-designtheory.
Taxing Extraordinary Proﬁts
Suppose the government considers taxing the proﬁts that the ﬁrm makes in
the good state g in order to remove the incentive to invest in the risky project
R. Can such a tax be effective? The answer to this question depends on
whether or not the government knows if proﬁts, when realized, are because of
excessive risk-taking or not.
Inthesimplemodelstudiedhere,evenassumingthatthegovernmentdoes
not directly observe the project choice made by the ﬁrm, the government can
tell with certainty which project was selected just by observing the realized
payoff. This is because 2 − δ  = 1 + k and 0  = 1 − k and thus, the so-called
full-support condition is not satisﬁed in our simple model. If the government
sees payoff 2 − δ, it knows that R must have been selected by the ﬁrm. For
this reason, it is possible in this model to tax the ﬁrm’s returns only if project
R was selected. Such a tax can in fact correct the incentives of the private
sector.
Indeed, let the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in node (R,g), i.e., when project R is selected
and the state of nature is g, and only in this node, be taxed in some amount
τ(R,g). This amount can be thought of as a “windfall proﬁt” tax—it occurs
onlyiftherealizedpayoffis2−δ>1+k,where1+k representsthe“normal”
proﬁt level that is realized in node (P,g) of the game tree. With this tax, the
expected value of equity under R is 1
20 + 1
2(2 − δ − τ(R,G)− (1 − k)),
which is the same as without the tax less
τ(R,g)
2 . The value of equity under P
is unchanged, i.e., it remains equal to zero. Thus, when
τ(R,g)≥ 1 − δ − k,
the value of equity under R becomes less than under P, so this tax corrects
the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest.
In reality, however, it may be hard to tell even ex post if the ﬁrm’s risk-
taking behavior, represented here by the choice of the project, was prudent
or risky. Suppose then that the government can observe the realized state of
nature but not the ﬁrm’s payoff. Any tax on proﬁts in the good state g must
be the same independent of which project was selected. It is immediate that
such a tax, τ(g), decreases the value of equity under both P and R, by the
amount
τ(g)
2 . Since R was selected without the tax, i.e., when τ(g)was zero,
it will continue to be selected with τ(g)different from zero. Thus, this tax
cannot correct the risk-taking behavior and the inefﬁcient project selection in
equilibrium.
Furtherextensionsofthemodelcouldincludeother,morecomplicatedtax
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sothegovernmentcannotdetecttheprojectselectionexpost, likelihoodratios
canbeusedtostaticallydiscriminatebetweenriskyandprudentﬁrmbehavior.
This information can then be used to implement taxation and other ex post
policies that discourage risky investment. Existing work on this problem
includes Marshall and Prescott (2001, 2006).
Imposing Binding Capital Requirements
Finally,letusconsidertheeffectsofabindingcapitalrequirementthatgovern-
ment regulations could impose ex ante, i.e., before investors select the project
and fund it. We will show that a large enough capital requirement eliminates
the ﬁrm’s incentive to take on excessive risk.
Up until now, we have assumed that equity investors provide k dollars
in initial investment and bond investors provide 1 − k. That amount is the
minimum level of equity investment necessary to ensure that debt issued by
the ﬁrm is riskless under project P with no government support. (Even in the
bad state b the ﬁrm can fully repay the debtholders if the face value of debt
is no larger than 1 − k because project P pays off 1 − k in state b.) In this
section, we will consider other levels of initial equity capital investment than
justk. Letusdenotetheinitialequityinvestmentamountbyκ, whichmaynot
be equal to k. We will also suppose that the government mandates that κ not
besmallerthansomeminimalamountκ ≤ 1. Thatis, governmentregulations
impose on the ﬁrm a minimum capital requirement constraint
κ ≥ κ.
With equity investment κ, the amount of debt investment the ﬁrm must raise
(and hence the face value of debt it issues) is 1 − κ.
If the government chooses a required capital level κ such that κ ≤ k,
then the minimum capital requirement constraint κ ≥ κ is not binding, so it
has no effect on equilibrium outcomes. We will therefore focus on binding
capitalrequirements, κ >k . Wewillalsoassumethattheﬁrmwillnotchoose
to hold more capital than the minimum level required. This is motivated by
the notion, which is not explicitly modelled here, that debt ﬁnancing is less
expensive than equity ﬁnancing.
Let us now examine the terminal payoffs to debt investors, equity in-
vestors, and the government when the capital requirement is binding. Equity
investment is κ = κ >k , and debt investment is 1 − κ = 1 − κ < 1 − k.
Under project P, even in state b the ﬁrm’s assets are worth more than the face
value of debt, 1−k>1−κ, so debt investors are repaid in full in both states.
The expected payoff to equity is148 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1 − k − (1 − κ)
2
+









which equals the initial investment, so equity investors break even in ex-
pectation. There is no government bailout when P is implemented, so the
payoff/cost to the government is zero.
UnderprojectR,theﬁrm’sassetsareworthlessinstateb. Thegovernment
bails out debtholders and incurs a loss in the amount 1 − κ. The expected
cost of the bailout is
1−κ
2 . Comparing with (3), it is immediately clear that
the cost of the bailout is smaller when capital investment is larger. Thus,
imposing a capital requirement with κ >k , even if the bailout equilibrium
is not eliminated, decreases the expected cost to the taxpayer. Thus, in the
inefﬁcientbailoutequilibrium,thecosttothetaxpayerislowerwhentheﬁrm’s
leverage is lower (equity to assets ratio is higher).
To show that a capital requirement κ can be chosen to eliminate the need
for bailouts altogether, let us now calculate the NPV of equity in the bailout
equilibrium as a function of κ. Under R , in state g, the ﬁrm’s assets are worth
2 − δ>1 − κ, so the ﬁrm is solvent and the payoff to equity in this state is
2 − δ− (1 − κ) = 1 − δ + κ. In state b, the ﬁrm is insolvent and equity is
worthless. The NPV of equity, thus, is
1 − δ + κ
2
− κ =
1 − δ − κ
2
. (4)
As before, cf. (3), the value of equity equals the expected cost to the govern-
ment,
1−κ
2 here, less the amount of waste of value generated by project R, that
is δ
2. It is clear from (4) that if the capital requirement κ satisﬁes
κ ≥ 1 − δ, (5)
then the NPV of equity is not greater than zero. This means that by selecting
R, equity investors cannot do better than just break even. Thus, equity is not
worthmoreunderR thanunderP. Forasufﬁcientlyhighcapitalrequirement,
we can see that equity investors’incentive to take on the wasteful project R is
removed. The ﬁrm will not select the inefﬁcient project R if doing so implies
gambling with its own money (to a sufﬁciently high degree).
We should note here that under a capital requirement satisfying (5), the
ﬁrm is still levered. In fact, if κ = 1−δ,the amount of debt the ﬁrm can raise
is δ>0. In order to eliminate the bailout equilibrium, it is not necessary to
require all-equity ﬁnancing. However, the amount of leverage cannot be too
high. (For example, if δ = 0.8, the minimum capital requirement would be
20 percent of assets.)
It is interesting to note that sufﬁcient capital requirements do not solve
the time-consistency problem by making the government committed to no
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government would still provide a bailout to creditors in state b, in the amount
δ. The expected loss to the government would still be positive in this case.
Thatloss, infact, equalstheamountofvaluedestroyedintheprojectR, which
is δ
2. The key here is the fact that, with a sufﬁcient amount of their own capital
on the line, by running project R, the ﬁrm cannot extract from the government
more than that amount. If κ is strictly larger than 1 − δ, even by a small bit,
the bailout equilibrium ceases to exist because the amount of value lost in R is
morethantheamountofresourcesthatcanbeextractedfromtheuncommitted
government. Thus,weseethat,ratherthanservingasacommitmentdevicefor
the government, sufﬁcient capital requirements provide the right risk-taking
incentives for equity investors.
Given that, as we assume here, capital ﬁnancing may be more costly than
debt ﬁnancing, regulators should be careful not to set capital requirements at
an unnecessarily high level. However, the fact that capital is costly should not
be used as a rationale for tolerating the inefﬁcient bailout equilibrium. As our
discussionshows,thecostlybailoutequilibriumcanbeeliminatedbyacorrect
capital requirement policy. The cost of equity ﬁnancing is exogenous to this
argument, i.e., government policy cannot change that. Given the restrictions
faced by the government, it is important to draw a distinction between the
problems government policy can and cannot solve. In our model, the inef-
ﬁcient bailout equilibrium is an example of the former and the high cost of
equity capital is an example of the latter.
4. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this article is to provide an elementary exposition of the
time-consistencyprobleminthegovernment’schoiceofitspolicytowardlarge
ﬁnancial ﬁrms that face insolvency. We use a simple model to show how this
problem arises when the failure of a large ﬁnancial institution has sufﬁciently
large spillover effects for the economy as a whole, which the government is
trying to prevent. The equilibrium outcome is efﬁcient if the government is
credibly committed to not bailing the ﬁrm out in case its excessive risk-taking
backﬁres. Undertheassumptionofperfectgovernmentcredibility, theprivate
sector behaves prudently and the government’s commitment is never tested in
equilibrium.
A government’s full commitment to letting a large ﬁrm fail and cause
adverse spillover effects on the economy is a very strong assumption. Given
political-economyconstraints,itisprobablyimpossibletoachievesuchalevel
of commitment in practice. The lack of time consistency of optimal policy
therefore should be considered a very real and serious problem. In the context
of our model, we discuss several ways in which excessive risk-taking and
inefﬁcient bailouts can be addressed despite the lack of commitment.150 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
One such way involves making changes to the process of resolution of
insolvent ﬁnancial ﬁrms. These changes should be aimed at decreasing the
negative spillover effects to sufﬁciently small levels. This approach may be a
fruitful way of thinking about the solution, but it requires further fundamental
research, given the incomplete understanding that we have of how exactly
the spillover effects arise in the economy. It is also hard to know if efﬁcient
resolution policy can restrict spillovers to a degree sufﬁcient to eliminate the
government’s ex post incentive to bail out systemically important ﬁrms.
The second way in which excessive risk-taking can be controlled in our
model involves direct government supervision of the ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms’
actions. If the government, at a reasonable cost, can observe investment
activities of the ﬁrms, it can enforce prudent risk-taking. This is the most
direct way in which it is possible to prevent the equityholders from taking
advantage of the implicit safety net that the government provides by being
unable to commit to letting a large ﬁrm fail in a bad economy.
Although direct monitoring of investment is very straightforward in our
simple model, it may be difﬁcult and costly to effectively implement in prac-
tice. The costs of monitoring ﬁnancial ﬁrms’compensation schemes may be
lower than the costs of monitoring entire portfolios of assets. For that reason,
restrictionsonthestructureofexecutiveandﬁnancialﬁrmemployeecompen-
sation packages can be a cost-effective means of helping eliminate excessive
risk-taking.
The fourth way we discuss involves imposing taxes on the extraordinary
proﬁts ﬁrms achieve if they take on an excessive amount of risk and are lucky
to see that strategy pay off in high proﬁts. That method, however, may be
particularly hard to implement in practice given the government’s imperfect
information about what exactly constitutes an excessive amount of proﬁt in a
given macroeconomic state.
Finally, we discuss how binding capital requirements can eliminate bail-
outs. With enough own equity capital, ﬁrms will not seek excessive risk even
if the government stands ready to bail them out in bad times. With ﬁrms
behaving prudently, bad times are not bad enough to necessitate government
support. In this way, bailouts are eliminated. Binding capital requirements
are quite simple to implement in practice. Given our imperfect understanding
of how a fully optimal resolution or supervision policy should be designed,
capital requirements seem to be the most practical solution to the excessive
risk-taking problem as of now.
The model discussed in this article can be extended in several directions.
One is to study the interaction between moral hazard and commitment in a
dynamic setting in which the government can manage private-sector expecta-
tions and its own reputation. Standard results in the repeated games literature
statethat, ifthegovernmentispatientenough, equilibriacanbeconstructedin
which the government would not bail out in the (R,b) node of the event treeB. Grochulski: Time-Consistency and Resolution Policy 151
and, thus, this node is never reached in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium,
bailouts, although off-equilibrium events, would still constrain the level of
efﬁciency attained in the equilibrium outcome. If the government’s patience
is sufﬁciently low (perhaps because of the electoral cycle), however, the efﬁ-
cient equilibrium cannot be sustained in the repeated-game setting. Given the
political-economy constraints, effective reputation-based deterrents to moral
hazard may be hard to establish.
Another extension of this model can involve relaxing the assumptions we
made on the preferences of debt and equity investors. However, one should
expect that the basic message of the model is not going to change if debt





how the time-consistency problem and optimal government policy depend on
the ﬁrm’s size. Also, in our discussion we have not been speciﬁc about what
kind of ﬁnancial ﬁrm we have in mind. These ﬁrms can be commercial banks,
broker-dealer units, or insurance companies, among others. Another way to
extend our discussion is to consider the case of banks in particular, whose lia-
bilities include federally insured deposits. In the case of insured deposits, the
guarantee of an ex post bailout is explicit. In that case, discussion of optimal
policy would include the issue of optimal ex ante pricing of federal deposit
insurance.
Ouranalysismakesclearthatthescaleofthetime-consistencyproblemof
government policy toward large ﬁnancial ﬁrms is determined by the spillover
effects in which the failure of one large ﬁrm can have a signiﬁcant impact
on the macroeconomy as a whole. Optimal government regulation policies,
including the optimal level of capital requirements, and, consequently, the
optimal structure of the ﬁnancial services sector will depend on what we can
understand about the nature and size of this spillover effect. Further research
on this important topic is needed.
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